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These recent studies by Alan Golding and Jed Rasula use cultural stud-
ies and ideology critique to historicize processes of canonization within
American poetry. Both treat canonization as a product of institutions and
communities as well as of individuals, analyzing the reception and anthol-
ogization of both mainstream and experimental poetry. Aside from con-
trasting historical scopes (Rasula treats the last fifty years, Golding the last
two hundred) and writing styles, their most salient difference is a matter of
competing ideas of academic publishing. Golding’s is the more familiar
model—a crisp, lean, 243-page University of Wisconsin Press book, while
Rasula’s is a rarer form—an often brilliant, though also rambling, 637-page
product of the National Council of Teachers of English. 
Golding begins with a concise history of anthologies of American poet-
ry that ranges from Elihu Hubbard Smith’s American Poems, Selected and
Original (1793) to Paul Hoover’s 1994 Norton Anthology of Postmodern
Poetry and reminds us that the question of evaluation must be understood
to complicate versions of literary history that see anthologies only as mat-
ters of preservation and revision. Golding demonstrates how for early
anthologists, “a poem’s, or indeed the whole canon’s, claim to excellence
rested on its embodiment of national characteristics” (6). For Smith, this is
secular federalism—which means that both Jeffersonian democrats and
puritans are not included. This type of ideological argument is more effec-
tive than some of Golding’s specific historical claims, as for instance when
he treats the anthologies (all published in the 1870s) of well-known poets
such as Bryant, Emerson, and Whittier by linking their conservative selec-
tions—in particular their exclusion of Whitman and Dickinson—to a read-
ing public affected by “the disorienting effects of the Civil War and of rapid
economic expansion.” Though his chapter does not develop this context, it
effectively sketches a history of organizing principles that moves from fed-
eralism though popularity and chastity of thought toward cultural critique
and newness in the early twentieth century.  
In his second chapter, Golding makes his own case for how canoniza-
tion occurs by arguing persuasively against what he claims is an overstated
view of institutional control in Terry Eagleton and others, as well as against
the poet-centered view of canonization we find in critics such as Helen
Vendler, Hugh Kenner, and especially Harold Bloom. The limitation of a
Criticism Vol. 41 No. 3: Book Reviews 403
model of poets canonizing poets is that critics do not “question from where
the later poet derives his or her putative power to canonize” (57). To take
issue with Vendler’s claims that poets always respond to other poets at the
level of style, Golding shows how John Berryman “responds to [Ann]
Bradstreet’s social and historical situation” (59). In a productive act of syn-
thesis, Golding understands canonization as a matter of individual agency
that can attain long-term effects only through institutional mediation.
Golding then argues, in chapter 3, that counter to its impulse of uniting
theory and practice, New Criticism helped to bring about the current
antagonism between “creative writing” and theory—first through its battle
with historical scholarship, and second by gradually downplaying the
explicit work of evaluation so that canons, of English lyric poetry in par-
ticular, seemed to emerge naturally. Thus the New Critical rejection of
Whitman (whose nationalism, radical democracy, and “loose” poetic form
were anathema to the New Critics) occurred because he failed to deliver the
limited effects New Critics attempt to generalize as the essential products
of “poetry.” 
These arguments are slightly more familiar than those developed in a
similar vein in chapter 4, which makes a compelling case for understand-
ing “literary history not only as a history of individual careers, important
books, and competing discourses but also as a history of writing within
communities” (121). By looking at the magazine Origin—which provided
early outlets for the work of Charles Olson, Robert Creeley, and Denise
Levertov among others—Golding charts the relations among editing, pub-
lishing, and canonization. Golding’s point is precisely not to detail the mis-
sion of Origin’s editor Cid Corman—who is shown, for instance, struggling
unsuccessfully to understand Charles Olson—but to demonstrate how
Origin created and distributed authority across careers, and how it created
alternative canons. Golding’s fascinating analysis of letters by Corman,
Olson, and Creeley, among others, demonstrates how, because of a smaller
publishing field, a single little magazine in the early 1950s could challenge
dominant poetics to a degree that is impossible now. Treating in detail how
a single magazine could not merely reflect but “create a movement or a
sense of community” (122) prepares the way for Golding’s consideration,
in chapter 5, of Language writing’s relation to processes of canonization
both within their “self-created network of little magazines and presses”
(121) and in their relations to academia. 
This is Golding’s best chapter; it defends Language writing against the
easy charges that it both lacks the political efficacy it wants to claim and
has been co-opted by the university. Golding disarticulates early, less ten-
able claims within the movement (in particular Ron Silliman’s argument
that realism is a form of reification) from the larger possibility that
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Language writing is producing meaningful change at the level of how we
understand literary history in relation to academia. First, because Golding
has throughout the book made a compelling case for the academy as an
unavoidable mediating force in poetry’s canonization, he can now assert
that “criticism of Language writing’s assimilation into the academy rests on
an impossible, ahistorical wish for an ideologically pure, uncontaminated
avant-garde that successfully resists cooption by the institution that it
attacks” (147). Instead, following Louis Althusser and Raymond Williams,
Golding suggests that we see Language writing as an attempt at “changing
the mediating institution of the academy from within” (146). To focus on
the institutional matrix of Language writing’s production and reception,
Golding continues, “enables us to defer dubious claims for the poetry’s
‘inherently subversive’ nature in favor of more tenable claims for its contex-
tual subversiveness” (158). Language writing is valuable for its ability to
make visible the “machinery of interpretation and of institutions” (160). 
While Golding brilliantly describes institutional contestation from
within, Rasula’s book attempts to enact it by inventing a new form of prop-
erly irreverent critical writing for both charting previous canonization
effects and constructing an intellectually responsible form of poetry histo-
ry. Characterized by virulent critiques, page-long metaphors, and the fabri-
cation of critical terms like “voice-over” and “canontology,” Rasula’s book
imagines a wax museum on San Francisco’s Fisherman’s Wharf as the
appropriate space for the chiseled poetic busts implied by our existing
forms of literary history and in particular by the most recent Norton
anthologies of poetry. Throughout, Rasula constructs a rich network of
“them,” at times called “the culture brokers” (2), and if it’s corresponding-
ly unclear who “we” are, I must admit wanting to be included. 
Rasula’s first chapter uses recent critical work on museums along with
a battery of postmodern theorists to develop this important and useful par-
allel between poetry anthologies and museums. For him, “American poet-
ry is not a pragmatically demonstrable state of affairs, but a social ‘imagi-
nary,’ something that exists only in display” (31). To foreground these con-
ditions of display, Rasula pries into American poetry’s obsession with the
would-be immediacy of poetic voice: “The seemingly autonomous ‘voices
and visions’ of poets themselves have been underwritten by custodial spon-
sors who have surreptitiously turned down the volume on certain voices,
and simulated a voice-over for certain others” (33). If at moments in
Rasula’s text this appears to be a condition produced by bad anthologies
and ahistorical criticism, at other moments—and I would say less convinc-
ing ones—this is simply what it’s like to write under late capitalism: “After
the corporate voice-over becomes generically indistinguishable from pub-
lic discourse, any act of communication is a form of bereavement, insofar
as it is the active reminder of how we perpetuate our own captivity” (44).
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By depicting post–WWII poetry as a vast symptom of the voice-over, Rasula
downplays the range of poetic practices—Black Mountain, New York
School, Language writing—that often understand voice as a contested
effect rather than a natural point of departure. Though Olson and the
Language writers emerge, later in the book, as less voiced-over than others,
insofar as Rasula himself tends to assume a voice that would diagnose total-
ized cultural conditions of the voice-over, he mixes down the interesting
noise made by concrete, contestatory practices of both writers and anthol-
ogists. 
Rasula’s second chapter is 250 pages long. Its arguments about the
institutional underpinnings of mid-century American poetry build from a
critique of the New Critics for, among other things, using science as a straw
man, through the Pound Affair (his award of the Bollingen Prize after hav-
ing been indicted for treason) as a would-be test of New Critical reading
principles—“an image of explosive intensities neatly contained by experts”
(118)—to an original survey of how the reputations of mid-century poets
(John Berryman, Theodore Roethke, and especially Robert Lowell) were
built. Lowell emerges as a New Critical wind-up doll, a “metrical automa-
ton” (151) whose carefully managed career—“his success was in effect a
committee fabrication” (ibid.)—Rasula nonetheless charts with a fascina-
tion reserved for the paranormal. Rasula is funny. He has the ability—as
any good wax museum docent should have—to blur the lines between the
monumental and the undead. Though the chapter’s main thread occasion-
ally disappears—as when Rasula spends several pages setting up Louise
Bogan as a non-partisan witness (for what begins to read like a nineteenth-
century novel about twentieth-century poetry) and then abandons her
before she has had an impact—frequent brilliant insights from the narrator
keep one reading. 
One example is Rasula’s sketch of ways that “poets with effectively
vocal styles” (270) benefited from the emergence of the reading circuit—an
important and as yet uninterrogated mid-century poetry institution; per-
haps an even stronger one is his project of distinguishing concepts like
poetry as “process” or engagement with “tradition” and “history” when
applied to the mainstream poetics of Roethke and Lowell from the quite
different (and more demanding) conditions these concepts often impose on
the New American Poetry: “If ‘process’ could be associated with the free
verse set pieces of Roethke, largely on the basis of thematic peculiarities
like his botanical imagery, Olson’s pronouncements on such matters as pro-
prioception, dreamtime, and Whitehead’s cosmology were bound to place
him at the lunatic fringe” (239). Similarly, Rasula articulates the shift in the
meaning of “tradition” brought about by the New American Poetry: 
Where “tradition” had become narrowly configured by
Shakespearean blank verse, a handful of English metaphysicals,
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and by Dryden, Pope, Wordsworth, Keats, and a cultural
Eurocentrism, a much vaster assembly now billowed into sight—
borne aloft by renegade autodidacts—ranging from Whitman,
Dickinson, Blake, and Smart all the way back to Hesiod, taking
into account T’ang China, Mesopotamian dynasties, Sanskrit poet-
ics, Oceanic and native American oral traditions, and a range of
modern poetries in other languages. (246) 
Finally arriving at the question of history, he argues, “Mainstream
American verse has often blithely taken history to amount to little more
than an evocation of images retained from childhood initiation to the plat-
itudes of nationalist rhetoric; and the ‘sophisticated’ poets appear to be
those, like Lowell, who extend their references to Renaissance Florence,
Periclean Athens, or Hannibal crossing the Alps—in short, set pieces suit-
able to nineteenth-century kitsch genre painting” (289).
A thorough and intelligent critique of what counts as “history” in poet-
ry history organizes Rasula’s third chapter, which surveys writings by
Bloom, Vendler, Robert Pinsky, Charles Altieri, Daniel Hoffman, David
Perkins and Jay Parini. “Some of the things that might be expected from a
literary history,” Rasula suggests reasonably, “are examinations of discur-
sive formations; community networks and collective action; the material
dimension of publication, distribution, reviewing; the original contexts of
poets’ own debates and rivalries; and, not least, a text that can be consulted
. . . for information about poets who have not received much, if any, criti-
cal commentary” (354). What we get instead in The Columbia History of
American Poetry, edited by Jay Parini, and in David Perkins’s History of
Modern Poetry is “normative theme and career profile essays in literary crit-
icism” (354) that consider only a few poets, all mainstream. It is not so
much this chapter, but rather Rasula’s book as a whole, that can be taken
as a convincing antidote. 
Rasula’s chapter on Language writing (which received attention when
it originally came out in Critical Inquiry and later in the anthology Politics
and Poetic Value edited by Robert von Hallberg) appears here prefaced with
a twenty-page inquiry into the differing forces of voice-overs: for or against
mainstream poetry, one cannot quite “imagine opening the latest volume by
Marge Piercy, and finding corporate logos gracing the white space at the
bottom of the pages” (379). What kinds of political effects are left for poet-
ry if it operates in a realm distinct from the largest corporate interests? Not
those traditionally associated with “oppositional politics” at the level of
theme, like Adrienne Rich, whose “obligation of political reference” and
“swollen poetic intensity” are, for Rasula, “grounded in methods of emo-
tional manipulation” (393). Though such poetry might have the strategic
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functions Rasula denies, he is convincing in his larger critique of Jerome
McGann’s distinction between poetries of opposition and accommoda-
tion—a distinction that “posits politics as a realm separate from poetry,
which poetry can only report on or represent” (391). Instead, Rasula argues
that “more than politics in the poem; there is also a politics of poetry, and
this is what language poets have largely addressed from the outset” (ibid.).
Rasula does a good job explaining what it might mean that the Language
writers are also publishers, readers, and critics. Because Language writers
are not “mutual celebrants of poetry as initiatory cult” but members of “a
community of readers” (397), their “group identity” works “to make pub-
lic the conceptual underpinnings of issues that had originated in private
exchange” (394). This of course breeds suspicion: “Criticism written by
poets has often been misread as a deviant method of self-justification,
which it then becomes the critic’s job to decode and realign with the poet-
ry. With the Language poets the case is complicated be the patently dialog-
ic character of the theoretical adventure” (404–5). 
The consequences of such dialogue and theory not being a part of the
creative writing workshops of the Associated Writing Programs is the sub-
ject of Rasula’s final chapter, an analysis both of the institutional underpin-
nings of the workshop tradition and of several recent anthologies. My only
quarrel with this generally good chapter is Rasula’s suggestion that while
the editors of several recent anthologies of avant-garde poetry are “trans-
ported by the reverie of the outside, the experimental, the dissident,” at the
same time they perform an “explicitly conservative function in purporting
to trace a genealogy of the vanguard” (461). Though Douglas Messerli’s
From the Other Side of the Century and Paul Hoover’s Norton Anthology of
Postmodern American Poetry are far from perfect anthologies, despite their
problems (which I don’t have space to consider) the collections actually
trace a number of genealogies. Neither should their editors apologize to the
contemporary world for making precedents available. Such an act, as
Rasula himself reminded us in a remark I quoted earlier, is obviously not
inherently conservative. It seems to me more possible to maintain a dia-
logue with anthologies so long as they remain interested, particular, and
not straining toward some kind of encyclopedic closure. Rasula’s fine
appendices can be taken as a direct extension of his argument. They
include:anthologies published since 1950; most anthologized poets (alpha-
betically and by number of appearances), poets by birth date; anthologies
of translated poetry; prizes and awards; poets by the number of critical
studies done on them; and books of poetry criticism since 1960. 
Both of these books constitute major contributions to poetry criticism
and theory. Though Rasula’s stagy rhetoric occasionally causes imprecision,
his experiment of reconstituting the language of poetry history and criti-
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cism will be of great value to those suspicious of monumentality and unsat-
isfied with criticism as the merging of psyches. In addition to being a use-
ful new reference source, his book will remain important as a bright,
humorous tour through the uncertain ground between poetic legitimacy
and social pathology that makes up mid-century poetry. Golding’s service
is both more specific and more general: he provides a clear and consistent-
ly insightful account of the ideological substratum of American poetry can-
onization over the last two hundred years. Along the way, Golding’s well
chosen case studies also demonstrate how 1950s little magazines and
Language writing can usefully complicate existing models of canon forma-
tion and literary history. 
Lytle Shaw
University of California, Berkeley
Echoes of Translation: Reading between Texts by Rainer Nägele. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. Pp. 143. $29.95. 
The task of translating difficult authors was recently taken up in an
article in the New Yorker by Cynthia Ozick, who comments on new trans-
lations of Kafka’s works that make Kafka more palatable to our present
tastes. Still, at the end of her article, Ozick not only laments the untrans-
latability of writers like Kafka but cites Walter Benjamin’s essay “The Task
of the Translator” and his view that the object of a translation is neither
meaning nor communication. If Benjamin aimed for palpability of a “pure
language” that should shine forth in the translation of an idiosyncratic use
of language by keeping its feeling tone, then Benjamin’s project is indeed
not what Ozick makes it out to be: “Platonism incarnate: the nonexistent
ideal is perfect; whatever is attempted in the world of reality is an imper-
fect copy, falls short, and is useless” (New Yorker, 11 January 1999, 86). 
Rainer Nägele’s Echoes of Translation demonstrates quite the opposite
perspective on Benjamin’s essay. In Nägele’s view, Benjamin pleads for the
materiality of language and for the unfamiliar connection between words
that turn them into new metaphors in the translator’s own language.
Accordingly, it is only through translation that we get a glimpse of what is
at stake in language, of language per se. Nägele has already written exten-
sively on the subject of language and the displacement of meaning in
Benjamin’s philosophy of language, and this new book joins his previous
works by taking up Benjamin’s sources in Hölderlin, Baudelaire, and Freud.
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In exemplary readings of these authors, with the brief addition of a discus-
sion of Nietzsche, this book reveals more than his earlier writings about
how Nägele learned to read from Walter Benjamin.
Indeed, a theory of reading allegorically in the intertextual space
between texts and languages is at the center of this book. Reading here is
meant to be a creative process, opposed to identification and empathy or
Einfühlung. Unlike Einfühlung, which is but a projective identification of
self with an other, reading constructs a new language and a different,
unpredictable figure in which the historical relationship between the bio-
graphical and cultural/political sphere is illuminated. Nägele is one of the
few writers on Benjamin who consistently links Benjamin with Freud and
interpretation with psychoanalysis in order to train his readers to hear the
resonances of one language in another’s. From the grasp of these reso-
nances or echoes an intertextual figure emerges that characterizes reading
as a praxis of translation rather than as exegesis. Of importance in this
praxis is the rewriting of unconscious traces of experience whose sensual
impact can be felt, instead of a retracing of reflective consciousness. Here
Nägele moves toward the body in language: in demonstrative readings he
shows truth effects of language that rupture the illusions of a psychology of
consciousness and reveal the splitting of the subject in its historical expe-
rience and affect. Nägele is after a kind of presentation (Darstellung) that
escapes representation. And he accomplishes this by revealing and con-
structing an allegorical structure in the texts together with their transla-
tions. 
In an essay on Echolalia he takes Benjamin’s “Task of the Translator” to
task for avoiding the slippage of meaning into the arbitrariness of lan-
guage.His model translator and poet here is Hölderlin, who exemplifies
Benjamin’s “task”: to translate the syntax of the original text literally at the
expense of destroying the idiomatic structures of words in his own lan-
guage. What is gained by this strategy is a new scriptive image or figure that
is opposed to the sound of the words that constitute it. The force of change
in word positions—words lose their hold in idiomatic syntax—hollows out
the word like an “arcade” in a “wall of syntax.” But in this hollow the
melancholic echo of its former usage (meaning) refracts from the walls of
its new surroundings, and what resounds—Nägele builds on Benjamin’s
shift in sensorium from eye to ear (Vernehmen)—can be cognized histori-
cally (Vernunft). This resounding is a sense of recognition, and ultimately
of remembrance, for which a new word or coinage has to be found. This is
the moment in reading as translating where an original sensation is relived
and language is only anticipated but not spelled out. Hence, the sensation
has no written presence but exists in what Lacan would call parole vide
(empty speech) in juxtaposition to what Nägele criticizes as misguided
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Einfühlung, parole pleine, or “full speech”: “Cognition aims at an anticipa-
tion or divination of a language in which it can impart itself as remem-
brance” (41). Nägele’s point is that language is not an expression of cogni-
tion; its signifying effects are independent of any authorial control. For
Paul de Man—and, for Nägele, too, who is indebted to him—the phenom-
enality of what the words say is cancelled, and hence the displaced word no
longer intends referential meaning but language per se, that is, a nonrepre-
sentational language in which the echo of the original tone of feeling
becomes tangible in its effects. Rather than seeing the thing behind or
through the word, one feels a sensation that has no concrete, representable
image. 
Examining Hölderlin’s use of the names of the ancient Greek gods,
Nägele pursues the loss of phenomenality in modernist poetics, always
reminding us this kind of poetics—Baudelaire, Nietzsche, and Kafka are
other examples—is a form of translation of an older symbolic system into
a new one. Such a translation does not exchange one for another but stages
the clash of both symbolic systems in the poetic text itself. Allusions to the
“true experience” of the gods is juxtaposed with the “mere allegorical” use
of their names by problematizing both usages. For Nägele this staging of
the clash of symbolic usage results in the allegorical staging of a loss of
experience altogether. With the loss of a symbol, the meaning of the gods
is, however, not lost, for the gods reappear as “allegorical anxiety” and
inform the poet’s rhetorical intensity. In other words, they lose the power
of the name as they become “mere language”—words that say something
else than they mean. Dionysus and Apollo are refigured into signs of sexu-
ality and death joined in the name of the Mother (Earth). As the figures of
representation in modernity, Dionysus and Apollo also represent the
melancholic nature of representation (Darstellung). Poetic representation
in modernity gains its meaning effects from an ongoing allegorical subtext
of mourning. The name “mother” produces the figures of the ancient gods
and with them longing and taboo. An example is Hamlet, who, in Freud’s
words, has become a “secular progression of the repression” of Oedipus.
But, it seems, representation thrives on repression; and its allegorical read-
ing, in the vein of Nägele, makes this constitutive repression and its lin-
guistic effects visible in the text at hand. 
Nägele’s treatise on reading as translation culminates in his third essay
on the figure of Eros and the feeling tone of love and unconsummated
desire in literary translations, especially in Hölderlin’s translation of
Sophocles’s Antigone and Benjamin’s translation of Baudelaire’s poem “A
Une Passante.” The essay turns on the Eros of and in translation, placing
Hölderlin’s and Benjamin’s translations against each other. How can ancient
Eros be transferred into modern literature and culture? What of him or it is
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transported? Nägele answers that it is the body, in its transformation from
the image of perfect beauty to the melancholic staging of its decomposition
(as corpse) and its dismemberment in the modern sexualized emphasis of
its erogenous zones. Eros figures as the intrinsic power of translation that
exerts its agency of transgression by shattering the forms of language.
There is no reconstruction, only construction. When translation of sense
between languages breaks down, the force of translation, or rather of lan-
guage—what Benjamin calls “the kernel of pure language”—appears in its
own right. Antigone and the “Passante” poem are the manifest appearance
of a translation of Eros, a translation from male to female. Natural Greek
beauty has turned into a figure of art and of civilization and its symbolic
order. Eros undoes the perfect unity of being. It unsettles the being of the
subject in that it shatters the house of being. What is the house of being in
this context if it is not language? Nägele construes Eros in his meticulous
multilingual readings as that which names the “transfer and transport itself
in a radical split of oneself from oneself” (109), which Hölderlin translates
as “madness.” If words don’t make sense anymore, the effect of Eros is the
apparition language itself, which in Hölderlin and Benjamin has the status
not of being but of becoming (Werden): being in the grips of (linguistic)
Eros becomes a “becoming.” Eros dissolves nature and turns it into culture.
In this position—often associated with Dionysus—Eros becomes identified
with the creator of names, the creative words of translation, of translation
as performative word. As such, translation cannot but be an artifact that is
produced in the space between the visible or phenomenal sense of the word
and the absence of this sense in the translator’s language. “Becoming,”
whether it is the becoming of pure language in Benjamin’s sense or
Hölderlin’s becoming of great understandings, requires a certain amount of
destruction of what is—of what senses we are used to. For readers to
“sense” such a becoming, translation has to be pushed to the limit of
semantic understanding: “But at this limit the kernel of the preface on the
task of the translator is silhouetted in the knot of overdeterminations”
(117). As long as we can feel the desire in language, we will not give up the
task of generating understanding, since it is precisely this desire for under-
standing, for becoming what one is no longer, that reveals desire to be part
of the logos, the word that creates. 
Nägele certainly has accomplished a highly creative task of reading
between various texts in several languages (Greek, German, French, and
English) pulling senses and allusions from each language and weaving
them together—not only for a model of how to read intertextually and sen-
sitively, but also for the construction of an allegorical figure of translation
itself. The prefix “trans-” alludes to that which is both beyond and differ-
ent from what is said. For Nägele, then, reading as translating cannot be
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accomplished except in metaphorical structures that highlight the sense,
without naming it, that something is carried over and passes—unless we
capture it in our listening to the words rather than in seeing them on the
page. But such readings can hardly be accomplished without the knowl-
edge of other languages and without a knowledge of the literary tradition,
both of which train the ear for meanings in other linguistic and cultural
contexts. Nägele’s is a book that our students ought to read because it does
try to know the “je ne sais quoi” that makes literature mean differently
from ordinary language. 
Nägele’s argument might be more readily understood if he had brought
more concrete psychoanalytic insights into how language constructs expe-
rience for us as readers to help answer the question why it is that we cling
to the positive or phenomenal sense of words. Why is there resistance to
reading compared to ready(made) interpretation? If the ear seems to be the
key to reading, is not language also broken up by the emphasis on sound
in the Walkman? How does this overwhelming sound make sense to the lis-
tener; it certainly makes him or her feel the transport, a being transported
in an erotic and physical sense. 
Angelika Rauch-Rapaport
Wayne State University
Shakespeare and the Spectacles of Strangeness: The Tempest and the
Transformation of Renaissance Theatrical Forms by John G. Demaray.
Pittsburgh, Penn.: Duquesne University Press, 1998. Pp. 174. $48.00. 
The overwhelming visuals and sounds of Prospero’s Books, Peter
Greenaway’s film adaptation of The Tempest, left me exhausted after two
hours in my seat. So visually striking was the film that my companion did
not even recognize it as Shakespeare. Greenaway’s emphasis on the visual
is appropriate to the original conception and staging of The Tempest accord-
ing to John Demaray. His new book develops some of the interests in the-
ater and spectacle found in his earlier works, Milton’s Theatrical Epic and
Milton and the Masque Tradition. He argues that the initial staging at
Whitehall and the courtly audience influenced the masque-like structure
and content of the text of The Tempest as we have it in the First Folio.
Demaray makes an important point when he insists that a critical consid-
eration of The Tempest would be incomplete without addressing the con-
texts of its original production. 
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As the First Folio is Demaray’s primary evidence, he has followed
Sidney Lee’s contention that the Devonshire copy of the First Folio
(Huntington 56399) is the most accurate (139). Using this copy of the play
enables Demaray to avoid any contentions that an edited edition might
raise. Demaray’s analysis of The Tempest sheds light on Jacobean stage tech-
nology, poses answers to several of the play’s critical problems and responds
to twentieth-century critics who tend to focus on selective elements of the
play at the expense of the whole. 
The book begins with an overview of the critical reception of The
Tempest. Though the play is grouped in the First Folio as a comedy with a
traditional five-act structure, Demaray believes this classification is not
authorial, but has to do with the unifying comic ending. He claims the
play’s sequence of events lends itself more to a continuous series of scenes
than to a five-act division, which was probably the work of an editor.
According to Demaray, the play itself is a transitional work, marking the
change in theater from staged dramas to elaborate, spectacular Restoration
dramas such as William Davenant’s adaptation of The Tempest (1670). 
For Demaray, the play fuses elements derived from masques, conti-
nental balets de cour, court spectacles, and theatrical intermezzi: “A
Prologue and induction; antic episodes of conspiracy and confused ‘mazy’
wanderings; Spectacles of Strangeness magically ending the conspiracy and
serving as fulcrums of action; Triumphs involving the ‘unmasking,’ recon-
ciliation and reentry into society of the central figure and a final Epilogue”
(60). The Tempest is thus a series of linked episodes of magic, rituals, and
thematic oppositions (46) providing constant spectacle on stage, but never
establishing or developing a complex plot. 
Demaray analyzes the play as a hybrid of masque and Latin drama
forms, but he also draws attention to the play’s unifying elements. Scenes
of disorder are balanced against scenes of control and integration. By the
play’s end, every lost character is found, sleeping sailors have been awak-
ened, and explanations given. But rather than end with a ballet or revels, as
a masque would, The Tempest concludes with a planned return to the “real
world” of Naples with the assistance of Prospero’s magic. The ending is har-
monious, but with a touch of contrast. 
The strongest influence on the play, Demaray finds, comes from the
masque tradition and, inevitably, from Ben Jonson. Part of Demaray’s thesis
rests on seeing The Tempest as a play which marks a transition from stage
drama to spectacle, but also from Jonson’s neoclassicism to the use of orig-
inal “hinges” or hieroglyphics, adjusting works to social and political pres-
sures. 
Court playwrights such as Thomas Campion and Samuel Daniel were
constantly modifying or even rejecting Jonsonian neoclassical iconography
and hieroglyphics in order to provide timely and popular court entertain-
ments. In composing The Tempest, Shakespeare was in a similar position.
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The storm and wandering images draw on the Aeneid, but the magical
island, the strange spirits, and visionary shows also allude to current topi-
cal matters. The island and shipwreck are familiar both from classical liter-
ature and current events, specifically, the wreck of the Sea Adventurer in
1609 in the Caribbean. The symbolism and allusion are not fixed, allowing
a variety of possible interpretations. 
Demaray regards this combination of inventiveness and neoclassicism
as one of the sources of the unanswered questions about allusions to spe-
cific historical events or people. Prospero may be Shakespeare, John Dee,
King James, or as Demaray muses, Inigo Jones. The character’s origins,
though, are in the central figures of Triumph spectacles, often a personifi-
cation of Britain as in Anthony Munday’s The Triumph of a Re-United Britain
(1605). Caliban is an anagram for cannibal, but the character is familiar as
an antimasque grotesque, or related to a Bacchus figure, or to the masque
character-type base “Earth” (55). Both characters are amalgams of influ-
ences. Neither original nor entirely allusive, they are, like the symbolism,
open to interpretation. 
Demaray’s contention that Shakespeare wrote The Tempest specifically
to be performed at Whitehall occupies the center of the book. Though the
play was most certainly performed at the Blackfriars and the Globe, ample
evidence is drawn from contemporary records and the text itself to make a
strong argument for Whitehall as the initial site. 
Used frequently for masques and plays by Jonson, Inigo Jones, and oth-
ers, the proscenium stage at Whitehall was technologically very sophisti-
cated. More so than the Globe or the Blackfriars, the Whitehall stage had
the potential of shutters, flat scenery, machinery for moving scenery, and a
variety of traps and levitation devices. The stage directions and character
descriptions in The Tempest would have functioned best on such a stage. 
A Whitehall staging provides a convincing solution to the editorial
quandary over the stage direction at IV.i.72 in The Tempest, “Juno
Descends.” This occurs some thirty lines before the characters verbally
acknowledge her presence. Rather than moving the stage direction, as some
editors have done, the elapsed time is accounted for by a post-and-beam
stage machine which would have allowed a slow steady descent from above
the stage. The post-and-beam machine is sturdy and controlled from the
rear of the stage, allowing movement in two directions simultaneously.
Other stages’ rope-and-pulley system would have been much more cum-
bersome and difficult to control. 
The seating and stage at Whitehall are also alluded to in the text.
Prospero asks the assembled characters to look in at his cell. “This Cell’s
my Court . . . pray you looke in” (V.i. 166–67/D[evonshire MS.]17). With
the stage at the same level as the King’s seat, the audience’s eyes would have
been drawn from one to the other. Only the King would have had an
uninterrupted perspective. Prospero at this point reveals his own seat as
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ruler of the isle, but acknowledges and reveals James I’s as the ruler of
Britain. 
The offstage space and use of flat scenery at Whitehall would also have
enabled smooth and frequent costume changes, which would have been
more difficult at a theater like the Globe. The stage machinery would have
allowed for a continuous sequence of action, uninterrupted by pauses for
scenery or costume changes. Ariel in particular makes a series of costume
changes, into and out of a Harpy guise (between III.iii and IV.i/D. 13), that
would have been smoother on a proscenium stage. 
Demaray concludes with a study of the play’s symbolism, which has
elements of the “open” court symbolism found in works like George
Chapman’s The Memorable Maske of the two Honorable Houses of Inns of
Court. Chapman’s masque contains symbolism so fantastic and classical as
to be “surrealistic” (116). The Tempest is perhaps not as extreme, but it is
formed around a tension between an ideal, innocent, utopian vision of
society and the imperfect, sometimes coarse, real society. This theme is
manifested primarily in scenes of discovery or revelation. When Prospero
reveals Miranda and Ferdinand playing chess, Sebastian calls it “A most
high miracle” (V.i.177/D.17). But as Demaray points out, Miranda’s and
Ferdinand’s conversation is of deception: 
Mir. Sweet Lord, you play me false. 
Fer. No my dearest loue, 
I would not for all the world 
Mir. Yes, for a score of Kingdomes, you should wrangle 
And I would call it faire play. (V.i.171–175/D.17) 
Although the sight of the living Ferdinand is miraculous, the lines are of a
teasing lie, playful though it may be. 
The discoveries also lead to a sense of self-knowledge. Gonzalo later in
the same scene exclaims, “In one voyage [we have found] all of us our-
selves / when no man was his owne” (V.i.207–13/D.18). Once the charac-
ters learn no one has died and they are able to return home, they find life
has improved. Ferdinand has found a wife and Prospero will return to
Milan. 
The Epilogue reveals the tension created by the hybrid character of the
play. A typical drama would not contain such a revelation, but a masque
Triumph or procession would. Only the actor playing Prospero unmasks;
the other actors do not reveal themselves to the audience. To do so would
be too close to an intrusion of commoners into the aristocratic world. The
actor playing Prospero is allowed the gesture, Demaray argues, because he
would have moved off-stage to the main floor, below the level of the audi-
ence. The revelation thus highlights the difference between an ideal stage
society with a harmonious ending and the real court society with its ranks
and divisions. 
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The quantity of information about Jacobean stage technology and
courtly performances is perhaps the most striking element of the book.
Demaray has combed through performance records, details of expendi-
tures, a great number of contemporary dramatic works, and original print-
ed editions of plays and masques. He provides seventeen illustrations,
including stage machines, photos of a model of Whitehall, and Inigo Jones’s
sketches. Illustrations from Nicola Sabbattini’s handbook of stage mechan-
ics, Practica Di Fabricar Scene, are particularly helpful in visualizing the
Whitehall stage. 
Demaray’s careful reading of the text and contexts of The Tempest and
of the drama of the day allow him to critique readings of The Tempest which
seek to find colonial or anticolonial elements in the play. Caliban, for exam-
ple, does seem charmed by Stephano and Trinculo, but they misjudge him
as well, a phenomenon familiar from the masque spectacle tradition. In
Milton’s Comus the title character similarly misjudges a human woman as
something divine. Demaray maintains that Caliban is not characterized as
a human from any known colonized space; he is more of an elemental earth
spirit as Ariel is an elemental air spirit. He argues that to focus on Caliban
or any other specific character as particularly symbolic or allusive—as an
exploited native, for example—without examining the play as a whole is
reductive criticism. 
Demaray is certainly correct in his emphasis on analyzing The Tempest
in its entirety. The conception of open symbolism, however, would seem to
allow a variety of interpretations to exist simultaneously. To say that The
Tempest is a play entirely concerned with colonialism would be reductive.
But to suggest that the character of Caliban cannot be seen as a colonial
“other,” among other things, would also seem to be inaccurate. Allowances
must be made for a variety of readings which do not necessarily negate one
another. 
Though the bulk of Demaray’s book is concerned with The Tempest and
its contexts, other plays and masques are discussed. The transition occur-
ring in Jacobean theatrical practices and The Tempest’s position in that
process are well marked by Demaray. Elements of earlier, Latin plays can be
found in The Tempest along with the more spectacular and innovative
masque forms that would make it an appealing play before and after the
Restoration. Demaray provides a convincing description of the play as a
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Romanticism and the Self-Conscious Poem by Michael O’Neill. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1997. Pp. xlv + 308. $75.00. 
Michael O’Neill’s subject, stated on the first page of his Introduction, is
“poetry that displays awareness of itself as poetry” (xiii). The book’s thesis
is less straightforwardly presented but the various components are in view
by the Introduction’s end some thirty pages later. Self-reflexivity in poetry
is an index of aesthetic achievement, and this feature or quality is discov-
ered in the canonical six male poets of the early nineteenth century (on the
authority of Helen Vendler an engagement with gender issues is politely
declined). Romantic poetry differs from earlier examples of self-conscious
poetry (two sonnets of Shakespeare and a poem of Marvell’s are the only
examples), and bequeaths this difference to post-Romantic poets such as
Yeats, Stevens, Auden, and Amy Clampitt, a few of whose works are dis-
cussed in an extended three-chapter coda. It is not clear what “post-
Romantic” means because the definition—it implies “affinity with and dis-
tance from Romanticism” (237)—tells us nothing, especially since earlier
we were told that Keats’s induction to The Fall of Hyperion ushers in post-
Romantic reflexiveness (219). The “problem of coverage” (xxxviii) is
solved by means of the touchstone method. Sections of poems, sometimes
a line or two, in a few cases readings of whole poems such as “Resolution
and Independence” and “The Sensitive Plant”—all are offered “as examples
of what is finest in their overall achievement” (xxxix). It is important to
note that the argument has a polemical purpose. In putting forward a
“refreshed” (xxxvi) sense of Romantic aesthetic achievement, O’Neill
wants to show that the recent approaches of historical contextualization
and ideological critique, specifically Jerome McGann’s, are misguided and
betray what is most valuable in Romantic poetry. O’Neill intends “to give
respect where respect is due—to the art and vocation of poetry” (xliv). 
The eleven chapters, all of which have been published separately, do
not yield to summary or paraphrase. Touchstone method aside, the cover-
age is spotty and gives an impression of arbitrariness: twenty-one pages are
devoted to ranging over Blake’s entire work, but twenty-five of sixty pages
on Shelley are devoted to one poem. One poem each by Yeats and Stevens
is discussed. Book Five of The Prelude, on books of course, is not men-
tioned, while a section of The Excursion is offered as a defense of that work.
What motivates the selection in each case? A loose, intuitive “taxonomy”
(xxvii) of three very indistinct kinds of self-conscious poetry is sketched
out in a few pages of the Introduction, but apparently this taxonomy is not
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an organizing principle and one forgets it entirely until we are reminded
that it exists on page 125. There are fine isolated insights that show that
O’Neill is closely attuned to the movement of a poetic line, but the internal
structure of the book is barely in evidence. O’Neill’s topic and his polemi-
cal purpose require theoretical and methodological expertise, but this is not
his strong point, and the book will not convince by force of sensitive read-
ings loosely connected to a central claim. The thesis is less a fully worked
out and substantiated argument than it is an ethos or a statement of faith,
something along the lines of “literature never did betray the heart that
loved her.” 
The case against O’Neill is formidable. He appears to be blithely
unaware of critics who have systematically taken up the topic of self-reflex-
ivity before him. One thinks immediately, for instance, of Lucien
Dallenbach’s The Mirror in the Text (1977), which is mostly about narrative,
but its typology of mise en abyme would have been a useful starting point.
For instance, it would have provided a framework for O’Neill’s observation
on the Maniac in Julian and Maddalo, that his speech “thematizes and pro-
vides a correlative for Shelley’s relation to his own poem” (139), and it
would have stimulated the identification of other examples. Neil Hertz’s
subtle analysis of specular moments in which he charts what he calls an
“end of the line” structure, several of them from The Prelude, might have
figured usefully as well. It is possible that, had O’Neill investigated the
scholarship, he might have found things that would have added substance
to his case, but that case would have had to be taken up on a more
advanced level of discourse. As it is, O’Neill’s polemic against historical
criticism is both misdirected and incoherent. It is typical of this book that
when it addresses the issue of “evaluation” it turns instinctively to Ivor
Winters and Leavis rather than to Barbara Herrnstein Smith on aesthetic
value and John Guillory’s comprehensive critique of Smith in Cultural
Capital (1993). The interesting question, at least for me, is whether aes-
thetic approaches can be integrated with historical ones, whether we can
describe the ways in which they are bound up with or indispensable to one
another, and Guillory’s book is one instance that opens up further serious
thinking.
O’Neill’s approach “centres on the aesthetic achievement signalled and
made possible by poetic self-consciousness” (xxvii). But self-consciousness
alone is not sufficient to indicate artistic achievement; it is not even enough
to guarantee that one is dealing with literature. Let’s briefly review a line of
thinking that has been central to twentieth-century literary theory but may
have been eclipsed in the recent vogue for antitheory polemics. 
Roman Jakobson, in a widely influential article, “Linguistics and
Poetics” (1960), described six different functions of language, one of which
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was the “poetic. “ In the poetic functioning of language the focus of atten-
tion, Jakobson claimed, was language itself, and the effect was to promote
an awareness of “the palpability of signs” and deepen the “fundamental
dichotomy of signs and objects.” By this definition of literariness Jakobson
argued that the distinguishing feature of literary language was its self-
reflexivity, its awareness of itself as a medium. Literature, then, by its very
nature is reflexive. But the poetic function is only one of six. In literature it
is dominant, but it may exist in other kinds of language as well where it will
be subordinated to a different dominant function in a different hierarchical
organization. This also means that the poetic function is not the only func-
tion of language in literature, leaving open the question of engagement
with social or moral issues. 
Following Jakobson but specifically citing the precedent of Monroe
Beardsley, Paul de Man in “Semiology and Rhetoric” (1975) refined the
argument to claim that literature was the place in which language was
aware of itself as rhetoric, by which he meant figure. The implication de
Man drew was that, at crucially important moments, literature was unread-
able because figures were unstable and could not be reduced to the logical-
ity of a grammar. The thickness of signs, Jakobson’s “palpability,” impeded
the very process of meaning construction; this experience of frustration, in
de Man’s view, was not only inevitable but salutary because it brought the
reader up short. What careful reading (in de Man’s sense) led the reader to
was self-awareness, an alertness to the imperial tendencies of the intellect
to reduce to its own rule whatever it comes into contact with, or, in other
words, to make the text a mirror of itself. Literature, it appears, is a verita-
ble hall of mirrors. 
When, very late in the game, O’Neill observes of Hyperion that “the
medium occupies centre-stage” (225), the reader can legitimately ask, why
only here? A similar sense of opportunities missed occurs when O’Neill dis-
cusses “Peele Castle,” which of course is a meditation on Beaumont’s paint-
ing: “Reference to an artwork in another medium allows Wordsworth to
explore what he is (and should be) doing in the poem itself” (55). A con-
sideration of ekphrasis (the word does not appear in this book) might have
been useful. It might have led to a reading of Shelley’s poem on Leonardo’s
Medusa with its brief but rich tradition of commentary. It might have orga-
nized a chapter around other instances. I do not mean to suggest that
O’Neill should have written a book to my prescription. But I do want to
register how unsatisfactory I find it as a reader to encounter a book on this
topic which gives the impression of deriving its newly discovered insights
from unmediated encounters with individual poems rather than engaging
productively with what is already available in the critical tradition. The
general impression this book leaves is of how much it refuses to take on
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board, how much it refuses to argue explicitly, how much it simply takes
for granted. 
O’Neill does not like historicist critiques because they demystify art to
get at its social implications. What he misses, in my view, is the extent to
which historical criticism is a methodological version of self-awareness,
ostensibly his subject. He dissents from McGann’s ideological critique, but
does not take seriously enough McGann’s explication and adoption of
Bakhtin in “Keats and the Historical Method in Literary Criticism” (1979).
Thus the whole issue of historical awareness and historical difference gets
submerged, or rendered trivial, in a view of aesthetics which celebrates the
fact of art or the skill of the artist to the exclusion of any other considera-
tion. 
Actually, I would argue, any account of artistic achievement must rely,
wittingly or not, on some form of historical explanation. For if a wide range
of language uses may include the poetic function in Jakobson’s sense, then
it follows that what counts as Literature in a specific place and time is
defined by more than the properties of its language. The issue is thrown
into relief especially in claims for change or difference. Thus, O’Neill opens
his book with a familiar gesture in much Romantic criticism, the assertion
that Romantic poetry is different and original. Yet, as we see shortly after-
wards, difference and originality must be asserted in historical-cultural
terms: 
Romantic poetry is a poetry that is creating the taste by which
it might be enjoyed, in part a consequence of a shift away from
patronage to the more impersonal laws governing the marketplace.
Yet enquiry into possible socio-economic determinants of
Romantic self-consciousness is not my concern. Instead I concen-
trate on its continued literary value. (xxii)
The idea that “socio-economic determinants” might actually be part of the
content of the self-consciousness of a Romantic poet, and that a response to
these things might also be in some way constitutive of “literary value”
rather than opposed to it, apparently never occurred to O’Neill.  
In fact, O’Neill never investigates or substantiates his claim for a “sig-
nificant difference” (xiii) in Romantic poetry; he points to only a few
instances in two writers before the Romantic period (dismissing the eigh-
teenth century entirely), whereas it could be easily argued that writers have
traditionally used devices such as ekphrasis or other forms of mise en abyme
to signal heightened moments in their texts. So what is the difference? How
define it? Are we dealing with the development of a technique, similar to
the increasing occurrence of free indirect discourse in prose fiction? One
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would want to know, to take one example, what exactly the difference is
between the quality of self-reflexivity in Pope’s Windsor Forest (Earl
Wasserman’s reading of the Lodona episode would be a point of departure)
as opposed to what one finds in Romantic poetry. But that sort of inquiry
could only be carried out by means of historical or literary-historical expla-
nation. Self-consciousness in poetry is not simply the deployment of the
traditional devices by which art foregrounds, and at times indeed demysti-
fies, its own procedures, medium, or condition of enunciation. It also
involves with these devices the writer’s engagement with pressing contem-
porary issues, broadly cultural when not specifically political. If O’Neill
took seriously his own observation about Shelley, that the poet is “increas-
ingly conscious that he does not write in a cultural, generic, or historical
vacuum” (141), then his differences with “politically correct critics who
think that systems of social relations hold a poet’s pen” (210) might have
been productive of more than mere caricature.
Robert J. Griffin
Tel Aviv University
Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of
Remembering by Marita Sturken. Berkeley: University of California Press,
1997. Pp. 384. $45.00 cloth; $16.95 paper. 
One might say that, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, American cul-
ture has embraced mourning. Thus Marita Sturken’s intriguing exploration
of cultural memory, as it negotiates the boundaries between private memo-
ry and historical record, is more than aptly timed. Her work is divided
among the memorials of the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, and the
AIDS epidemic. Each of her examples can be classified as a moment of rup-
ture in the threads of time; it is those frayed ends, that gap between the
truth and the telling, that resists closure and becomes Sturken’s Tangled
Memories. Framing her study of remembrance in the 1980s and 1990s, she
analyzes first how our culture memorializes those who died an initially
unsung death, then those who fought in a war notable for its absence of
death, and finally those who, while still walking among the living, are per-
ceived as being the already dead. Throughout the text, she investigates the
forms that social remembrance takes and demonstrates how personal
experiences are translated into a cultural memory that rescripts the
authorized account of an event. Her book does not disregard individual
recollection, loss, or sorrow, but instead weaves those strands of remem-
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bering into the collective memory that can define a culture’s sense of
nation and history. 
Sturken first develops the premise that, while memory can be embed-
ded in objects associated with an event, photographs and video can also be
catalysts in the creation of memory. She uses the Zapruder film of the
Kennedy assassination, the televised explosion of the Challenger, and the
videotape of Rodney King’s beating to reveal the importance of the image
in our culture’s history making. It is not so much what the image is as how
the image is viewed. Rather than simply capturing a memory or showing
what really happened, the gradual transformation of the Zapruder film
from Time-Life stills to popular culture streaming (as in Oliver Stone’s JFK)
has created a collective, albeit false, memory of witnessing Kennedy’s assas-
sination live on television. Sturken argues that it is exactly this coloring of
cultural memory, this sense of having an intensely personal moment of
shock and sorrow and simultaneously sharing it with the entire country,
that creates for many a means of identifying with the national culture.
There are obvious connections between the Challenger explosion, which
was televised live, and the Rodney King videotape, which was televised at
length. Sturken discloses the cultural meanings of all three of these images
as they have been appropriated, reenacted, and rescripted—first by the
media and then later by the law. She deftly maneuvers the image, and its
cultural status, into a means of shifting the national memory. 
When Sturken brings us back to the screen and memory, she is no
longer referring to the cathode-type screen that carried the aforementioned
images into American culture. In the cultural memory of the Vietnam War,
the screen, acting as both backdrop and barrier to individual experiences of
the war, is embodied by the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. The dichotomy of
the personal versus the cultural in history is carried through her look at
whose voice is validated and reverberated by the memorial and whose
echoes of experience are condemned to bounce silently off the glossy stone.
After its controversial construction, the Wall became a site that erases the
authorship of individual memory and transforms those objects first left by
individual mourners at the site—collected as “lost and found”—into cul-
tural artifacts. Rather than becoming a memorial that seals the narrative of
official history, Sturken shows that the naming of the dead allows each
strand of individual memory to loop outward and encircle concentric com-
munities of pain and sorrow. This, along with the wounds of war perma-
nently etched upon the flesh of the veterans who flock to the site, refuses
redemption and, while offering solace to some, resists the efforts of others
to put to rest the dead. 
We return again to the power of the image as Sturken reveals the influ-
ence of cinematic representations on the cultural memory of Vietnam. She
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effectively demonstrates how films transcend the traditional icons of war
within cultural memory, creating meaning beyond the original frame of the
incident. Her examples of popular culture’s depictions of Vietnam are well
chosen and succinctly discussed, showing how the films themselves have
become forms of memorial. As she points out, much of America receives its
education in history through this medium, and Vietnam is being rewritten
by the cultural memory located in these productions. What little use soci-
ety initially had for those who returned alive from the jungles of Southeast
Asia is rescripted in the prolific release and popular reception of screen-
plays that portray a romantic heroism in the lone man battling the evils of
both the VC and D.C.  
When Sturken shifts her attention to the Persian Gulf War, it is not
because she is done with the subject of Vietnam. Instead she builds an argu-
ment that the Gulf War, and its handling by the media, was a direct reac-
tion to the currents of the cultural memory of Vietnam that were still flood-
ing society. It is often the memory of the previous war that dictates the
future of manufactured war. While cultural memory influenced the revi-
sion of the Vietnam War, Sturken also suggests that the military impetus
behind the Persian Gulf War was to create a historic turning point that
would rewrite Vietnam (and Korea) as momentary digressions in the nar-
rative of U.S. history. In her dealings with Vietnam and cultural memory,
Sturken had established the body as a site of memory; now, she redirects
that same stream of thought into the deserts of the Gulf War. But where
does one construct such a memorial when there are no casualties of war?
In a surprising but successful twist, Sturken locates this cultural memory
in the Gulf War Syndrome as it continues to force the revision of a war that
was intended to be a simple and singular narrative in history. 
How appropriate that Sturken, who rarely relinquishes her tight reign
upon this text, leads us from a bloodless war into a battle with blood.
Looking at the AIDS epidemic and its many representations in cultural
memory, Sturken returns us to the iconic aspect of the body—this time the
image is of PWAs (Persons with AIDS)—and the politics with which the
body is currently marked and marketed. The same merchandising that is
used to raise funds for research has also been accused of commodifying and
victimizing PWAs. Entire communities have been retailored as a result of
the AIDS epidemic: according to Sturken perceptions of gay lifestyle, once
patterned by the sexual act, have now been altered to fit the healing and
compassionate individuals seen among the ill and the at-risk, while black
and Latino communities have been torn by the media’s insistent catego-
rization of their PWAs as drug addicts. The cultural status of AIDS is being
renegotiated and rewritten as it transverses the (culturally) constructed
communities of gays, blacks, Latinos, drug users, and heterosexuals.
424 Criticism Vol. 41 No. 3: Book Reviews
Sturken predicts that the cultural memory of the AIDS epidemic, with its
complex politics and changing population, will resist closure in society. 
With AIDS, as with the Vietnam War, the authority of individual mem-
ory is undermined by the mass memorializing of victims. Here the NAMES
Project AIDS Memorial Quilt is compared to the Vietnam Veterans
Memorial. Sturken’s juxtaposition of the physicality of the handcrafted
quilt and the etched enamel of the Wall speaks to the issues of masculinity
and national identity she raised in earlier chapters on the Vietnam
Syndrome. The quilt creates an atmosphere similar to the scroll of names
on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. Much like the objects left behind at the
Wall, the panels of the quilt both represent the ways in which individuals
have mourned and simultaneously dissolve into anonymous emotions
when viewed in their sheer number. The Quilt travels to the spectator in
bits and pieces, and Sturken includes here an analysis of the importance of
the location of (or, in this case the inability to concretely locate) a memor-
ial. The AIDS Quilt is not permanently affixed in any official capacity—nei-
ther in sanctioned history nor at the Washington Mall. Perhaps this makes
the memorial even more appropriate, as the AIDS virus itself is not fixed
within the body but is instead constantly circulating within the blood. In
her last chapter, however, Sturken does posit that the virus is in one sense
already fixed within memory—more specifically, it is recorded in the
immune system. With micrographs she is able to produce images that are
the equivalent of “popular culture” representations. At times it seems she
is as determined to deride the news media as she is to develop the cultural
memory of AIDS, but rather than dissolving into senseless tirade, this tan-
gent remains pertinent when the reader keeps in mind the often unbal-
anced relation of “science” to “story” in the saga of AIDS. In this sense,
Sturken has little difficulty in comparing the enlarged microscopic images
to the stylized mushroom clouds of war or in associating the terminology
used to describe the progression of the disease to hypermasculine narra-
tives about espionage and guerilla warfare. 
Just as we are still fighting the war against AIDS, it would seem that we
are still writing our wars against the Iraqis and the Vietnamese through the
cultural memory of these events. In a society inundated with images of war
and death, the meaning (and the making) of memorials is, now more than
ever, in constant flux. Sturken does not attempt to untangle the fragile
bonds that tie our experiences to our history; instead she focuses on, and
succeeds at, convincing her reader that how we remember, as well as what
we forget, weaves the fabric of who we are.
Susan Beckwith
Wayne State University
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Erotic Innocence: The Culture of Child Molesting by James R. Kincaid.
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998. Pp. vii + 352. $24.95. 
Some might complain that James Kincaid’s latest book is a mere repe-
tition of his thesis from Child-Loving: The Erotic Child and Victorian Culture
(1992), but if so, it bears repeating. First, Kincaid is helping to define the
field of Childhood Studies, not only by treating childhood as a social con-
struction, but by providing a methodological link between literary and cul-
tural studies. 
His central premise is that childhood is socially constructed by adults,
thus a cultural concept more than a biological factor: “The child is func-
tional, a malleable part of our discourse rather than a fixed stage; ‘the child’
is a product of ways of perceiving, not something that is there” (19). As a
result of adult desire, projection, nostalgia, and frustration, childhood is a
repository of negations, defined by lack. Kincaid views this process as eroti-
cizing youth. But as a pedophilic culture, the West (Kincaid is diplomati-
cally general in his finger-pointing) is in denial, creating a mythology of
pedophile scapegoats from which to distance and through which to purify
ourselves. Rather than denying that true pedophiles exist, he argues that
there is also a degree of pedophilia in the imagery and discourse of main-
stream culture that must be recognized as such if we are to change the
myths and constructions that perpetuate it. 
When readers get past any hysterical indignation they might feel about
Kincaid’s diagnosis, they will likely recognize its truth. Erotic Innocence is
rigorous in its presentation of evidence, rendered particularly effective by a
creative but critically reliable methodology. In the introduction, Kincaid
directly opens his argument: “Our culture has enthusiastically sexualized
the child while denying just as enthusiastically that it was doing any such
thing” (13). In “Trapped in the Story,” Kincaid illustrates this point with a
revealing critique of the public response to a Los Angeles high school
teacher who was (falsely?) accused of molesting her student. His reading
exposes the prejudicial power of the stock narratives our culture conve-
niently supplies in such circumstances, reminding us not to believe the sto-
ryline before the facts. This analysis prepares his reader for a larger look at
our culture’s pedophilic metanarrative. 
In the following chapter, Kincaid briefly provides a genealogy of this
narrative, explaining that the concept of childhood developed in conjunc-
tion with modern sexuality: “One somehow got implanted in the other, and
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it shouldn’t have happened” (52). Both historically and theoretically,
Kincaid shows how childhood is problematized by sexuality and its inher-
ent connection to it. 
In the next chapters, the most effective of the book (and those of par-
ticular interest to cultural and literary studies), Kincaid goes on to estab-
lish our culture’s denial of this connection, our denial of that denial, and
the resulting bifurcation of children into “angels and ghouls” (30). This is
done mostly with evidence from court cases, news publications, and film.
He compares “real life” images of children with filmic ones, juxtaposing
them with great ease and convincing rhetoric. More importantly, he offers
causal explanations: we cast children as angels out of nostalgia and as dev-
ils out of envy and resentment, because of our own inability to repossess
childhood. Kincaid’s final chapters thus aim to expose the scapegoating of
public figures, and other victims of dubious accusations, while debunking
the pedophilic myths that surround them. Scapegoating and mythmaking
create false security in clearly defining pedophilia as identifiable and else-
where. We wash our hands of our own child-loving. 
Kincaid’s premise of childhood’s constructedness is particularly useful
to those interested in literary and filmic representations of childhood, but
also to cultural studies in general. In continuing with Philippe Ariès’s con-
structivist approach, Kincaid is answering to a new interest within cultur-
al studies concerning age as a social, not just biological, factor of subjec-
tivity/identity. More original, however, is his contribution in setting a
methodological example. 
It was his seemingly inconsistent methodology in Child-Loving that
critics disliked. This, in my opinion, is more indicative of the lack of con-
sensus across fields than of problems with Kincaid’s scholarship. For exam-
ple, historians criticized Kincaid’s lack of chronology and historical fram-
ing. Literary critics were displeased with the awkward and minimal use of
close textual reading. Social historians and folklorists were disappointed
with Kincaid’s lack of empirical data or child testimonies. But one thing
these critics have in common is missing the point, a point that Kincaid
refined and makes more clearly in Erotic Innocence. He is not writing as a
historian or social scientist; he is a cultural and literary critic, and as such
his focus belongs to language and discourse. By evaluating Kincaid’s work
according to these standards, readers will appreciate the field he is engag-
ing, Childhood Studies. 
In response to Child-Loving, Don R. Cox points out that his book “is
anecdotal, a montage of bits and pieces of culture selected into a pattern
that seems to make a meaningful statement” (Nineteenth-Century Literature
48: 392). What better way to describe the fusion of cultural studies and
close reading? Though his sources seem scattered and gratuitously chosen,
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the book does make a meaningful statement, and in its methodology serves
as an example of how close readings can be informed by cultural studies.
Cox also writes that Child-Loving “is not really a book about Victorian cul-
ture so much as it is a book about our culture” (390). In fact, Kincaid
seemed to use the Victorian setting to show the genesis of cultural
pedophilia and reflect on the twentieth century. In Erotic Innocence, evi-
dence and theory cohere because Kincaid limits his focus to twentieth-
century America, where the phenomenon is rampantly demonstrated due
to the information explosion and media saturation. Kincaid also shifts his
focus from an overly diverse set of textual exemplars in Child-Loving to a
coherent grouping of American film sources (from the 1950s to the pre-
sent) to substantiate his point. 
Most significant, and indicative of the field’s liminality, were twentieth-
century critiques of Kincaid’s approach from the perspective of child-
centered study. Maria Tatar wrote of Child-Loving that, “without any real
data about the inner lives of the targets of pedophilia, Kincaid can only
repeatedly point the finger of blame at our horrified fascination with child
abuse. . . . He is no closer to getting inside the mind of the child than those
who tell the story about depraved adults victimizing children” (American
Literary History 7: 742). But Kincaid is not trying to study the mind of any
individual child; he is critiquing discourse that constructs a generalized
notion of “the child”: “What we think of as ‘the child’ has been assembled
in reference to desire, built up in erotic manufactories. [We] have been
laboring ever since, for at least two centuries, both to deny that horrible
and lovely product and to maintain it” (4). Kincaid’s task is to read repre-
sentations of childhood, not a child’s mind. 
In Erotic Innocence, his reading of these representations produces some
explanations for our intense love/hate relationship with children in dis-
course: that adults are nostalgic for their lost past, yet resent children who
remind us it cannot be repossessed; that we displace images of heaven and
hell onto children to compensate for lost religion; that we use children as a
“philosophical weapon against skeptical and secular rationalism” (53),
thus associating childhood with both peace and anarchy, innocence and
irrationality; that we use children as transitional objects regardless of our
need, because children are easy to construct without having to face empow-
ered resistance. For the most part, however, Kincaid glosses deeper causes
and blames pedophilic narratives. His method is to illustrate adult desire
more than to analyze it. 
Throughout the book, Kincaid emphasizes the textuality of the
pedophilic phenomenon. The problem is based in cultural narratives that
in turn perpetuate the problem. The solution? He forewarns in his intro-
duction, “We need only tell different stories. We can do that” (6). Perhaps
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the final chapters are his least effective in that they follow this cyclical nos-
trum. Although his main goal is to rewrite the floating narratives of child-
centered eroticism and pedophilia-phobia, his own logic calls for deeper
phenomenological analysis. He applies psychoanalytic principles in his
reading of cultural narratives but neglects to provide a specific analysis of
adult desire, a deeper understanding of which would help to rewrite the
narratives of our culture or automatically heighten our critical awareness of
the old ones. But how can we purge without a further causal investigation
of adult desire? Beginning and ending at the level of the “stories,” we over-
look root causes. After all, our culture has created the stories that create the
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